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ESSAYS 
 
THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY, 
TRUMPISM, AND  
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 
J. RICHARD BROUGHTON* 
This Essay focuses on the role of the federal death penalty in the national debate 
over capital punishment, and in particular, the use of the federal death penalty in 
the Trump Administration.  The election of Donald Trump to the presidency will 
likely have the effect of not simply preserving, but of potentially strengthening, the 
federal government’s use of capital punishment for certain serious federal offenses.  
Two primary factors bolster this assertion.  First, the President has employed, and 
will likely continue to employ, strong rhetoric that advocates capital punishment in 
appropriate situations. And second, the President has appointed, and will likely 
continue to appoint, high-level prosecutors who will be committed to federal death 
penalty enforcement and judges, like Neil Gorsuch, who will be unlikely to support 
abolition through adjudication.  This Essay cautions, however, that some forms of 
presidential rhetoric could also have the effect of undermining or weakening the 
legitimacy of the federal system.  This Essay therefore urges the President to take a 
more cautious rhetorical approach, one that supports the death penalty generally 
but that also defers in specific cases to the informed judgments of professional 
prosecutors in the Department of Justice, thus enhancing public confidence in the 
fairness and objectivity of federal death penalty review. This Essay then argues that 
Congress, along with federal prosecutors, can also strengthen the federal death 
penalty system by giving new attention to civil rights violations as a basis for 
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pursuing capital punishment. By amplifying the connection in existing law 
between the federal death penalty and civil rights, Congress and the Justice 
Department can help to demonstrate that the death penalty can be consistent with—
and an important part of—a robust regime of civil rights enforcement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Conversations about capital punishment, like many political debates 
on matters of public importance today, are too often characterized by 
an unhelpful absolutism.  In these moments, the conversation proceeds 
as if our only choices are either abolition or mandatory executions.  
Nuance is sacrificed in pursuit of simplicity.  Tribalism and partisanship 
often prevail over considerations that might sensibly steer the 
conversation away from the extremes.  The reality of capital punishment 
in America, however, requires a far more complex conversation. 
Of course, there are useful debates to be had over whether any 
American jurisdiction should have a death penalty at all.  In recent 
years, a few jurisdictions have successfully abolished their capital 
punishment systems, a trend that could be cited as evidence of the 
death penalty’s uncertain future.1  But recent efforts at abolition have 
                                               
 1. See Jaime Fuller, How Many States Have Abolished the Death Penalty Since 2000?, 
WASH. POST (May 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/ 
2014/05/14/how-many-states-have-abolished-the-death-penalty-since-2000 (reporting 
that eighteen states have abolished the death penalty). 
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failed in other jurisdictions, including California,2 New Hampshire,3 
Colorado,4 and Nebraska.5  Moreover, in Delaware, the State Supreme 
Court ruled in 2016 that the State’s capital sentencing procedures 
violated the Sixth Amendment, and, thus, the court invalidated the 
practice.  In response to the court’s ruling, the Delaware House of 
Representatives passed legislation that would reinstate the capital 
sentencing procedures.  Moreover, in Delaware, the State Supreme 
Court ruled in 2016 that the State’s capital sentencing procedures 
violated the Sixth Amendment, and, thus, the court invalidated the 
practice.6  In response to the court’s ruling, the Delaware House of 
Representatives passed legislation that would reinstate the capital 
sentencing procedures.7  Furthermore, public support for capital 
                                               
 2. Associated Press, Death Penalty Repeal Effort Fails Again in California, NBC BAY 
AREA (Nov. 9, 2016, 10:04 AM), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/ 
Californians-Favoring-Death-Penalty-Reform-Rather-Than-Repeal-400496811.html 
(describing how ballot measures to repeal the death penalty failed twice in four years); 
see Mike McPhate, California Today:  Why Californians Kept the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/us/california-today-death-
penalty-vote.html (suggesting that the second rejection of the death penalty repeal in 
California was potentially caused by the country’s political climate and confusion 
caused by dueling capital punishment measures on the ballot). 
 3. See Mark Berman, New Hampshire Won’t Repeal the Death Penalty, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/04/ 
17/new-hampshire-wont-repeal-the-death-penalty (pointing out that New Hampshire 
is the only remaining New England state to still have the death penalty). 
 4. See Bente Birkeland, An Effort to Repeal Colorado’s Death Penalty Fails, ASPEN PUB. 
RADIO (Feb. 16, 2017, 11:02 AM), http://aspenpublicradio.org/post/effort-repeal-
colorados-death-penalty-fails (reporting on Colorado’s failed fifth attempt within a 
single decade at repealing the death penalty); see also George Brauchler & Rich 
Orman, Lies, Damn Lies, and Anti-Death Penalty Research, 93 DENV. L. REV. 635, 640 
(2016) (rebutting recent scholarly research that suggested Colorado’s death penalty 
prosecutions were marred with racial bias). 
 5. See Aliyah Frumin, Election 2016:  Nebraska, Oklahoma Vote in Favor of Death 
Penalty, NBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:45 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ 
2016-election-day/election-2016-nebraska-oklahoma-vote-favor-death-penalty-
n681301 (describing how Nebraska’s death penalty remained in force after citizenry 
overwhelmingly rejected its unicameral legislative repeal effort).  Oklahomans also 
overwhelmingly approved a ballot measure that said the death penalty is not cruel and 
unusual punishment and amended the state constitution to say that any method of 
execution is acceptable unless forbidden by the Federal Constitution.  Id. 
 6. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433–34 (Del. 2016) (holding that Delaware’s 
death penalty statute violates the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement because it 
allows a sentencing judge to weigh “any aggravating circumstance” in the selection 
phase of a death penalty sentencing, independent of the jury). 
 7. See Randall Chase, Delaware House Votes to Reinstate Death Penalty, U.S. NEWS & 
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punishment remains high,8 and may even be understated once one 
accounts for the facts and circumstances of a particular case.9 
Moreover, the recent decline in executions is often cited as evidence of 
the death penalty’s impending demise.10  But perhaps it is simply evidence 
that death penalty jurisdictions are becoming more cautious in how and 
when they employ their death penalties.  Perhaps America is simply 
moving toward a more limited death penalty.  A limited death penalty 
system, though, is not the same as an abandoned one.  And if this is so, 
then employing the death penalty only on rare occasions and in especially 
deserving cases should, by itself, hardly be an argument for its invalidity. 
Finally, there remains the contention that America’s moral 
evolution should lead inexorably to its wholesale abandonment of 
capital punishment, constitutionally and politically.11  But perhaps 
                                               
WORLD REP. (May 9, 2017, 6:15 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/ 
delaware/articles/2017-05-09/delaware-house-votes-on-reinstating-death-penalty 
(describing how the decision to pass legislation reinstating the death penalty, despite 
the state Supreme Court’s ruling, may have been influenced by the killing of two law 
enforcement officers earlier in the year). 
 8. See Jeffrey Jones, U.S. Death Penalty Support Lowest Since 1972, GALLUP (Oct. 26, 
2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/221030/death-penalty-support-lowest-1972.aspx 
(admitting that even though support for the death penalty is at its lowest level since 
1972, fifty-five percent of the public supports the death penalty). 
 9. See J. Richard Broughton, Hate Crimes, the Death Penalty, and Criminal Justice 
Reform, 37 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 185, 204–05 (2016) (explaining that current 
public opinion polling on the death penalty does not inform respondents of particular 
facts and circumstances that could affect a decision whether to support its application 
in a specific case); see also Stephen F. Smith, Has the “Machinery of Death” Become a 
Clunker?, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 869–70 (2015) (expressing caution in relying on 
polling-based measures of public support for the death penalty because past polling 
results have been unpredictable and often unaffected by events likely to have “[swung] 
the pendulum radically,” such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks). 
 10. See Richard C. Deiter, The Future of the Death Penalty in the United States, 49 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 921, 921, 925–26 (2015) (citing the emergence of DNA testing 
technology as an exoneration tool; the emergence of life without parole as a cheaper, 
alternative sentencing arrangement; and the drop in the nationwide murder rate as 
reasons for the decline in the use of the death penalty); Brandon L. Garrett et al., The 
American Death Penalty Decline, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561, 563–64 (2017) 
(highlighting how the administration of the death penalty has declined dramatically 
based on a county level review of death sentencing data across the country). 
 11. This is reflected in the effort to apply the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving 
standards of decency” interpretation against capital punishment.  See, e.g., Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269–81 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); cf. Arthur J. Goldberg 
& Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 
1778, 1784 (1970) (arguing that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
should be evaluated according to “evolving standards of decency” and suggesting that 
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there remains a place in the moral universe for a limited system of 
capital punishment.  Perhaps there is some space for the belief that 
reasoned moral judgment may actually require at least the option of a 
death penalty, one placed within the framework of limited government 
power and protection for rights—with requirements of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt and trial by jury, multiple layers of prosecutorial 
and judicial review, and the opportunity for executive mercy. 
Once we consider what legal punishments should at least remain an 
option—for example, someone who masterminds the killing of nearly 
3000 people on September 11, 200112 or who intentionally detonates a 
bomb at a large office building13 or at a crowded and popular sporting 
event14—perhaps we can conclude that a morally serious, morally 
confident political community can locate in the reasoned moral 
judgment of its citizenry a narrow space for the death penalty, as a just 
and proportional punishment option in a few especially deserving cases. 
These are worthy conversations.  But in many places throughout 
America, the weight of arguments in favor of abolition simply does not 
appear to have garnered the support of political majorities who are 
willing to wholly abolish capital punishment in all of its forms.15  Perhaps 
                                               
an Eighth Amendment standard that forbids punishments that are “‘degrading’ in 
their severity and ‘wantonly imposed’” is better). 
 12. See Indictment at 12–13, United States v. Mohammed, No. 93-cr-180 (S.D.N.Y.) 
(filed Dec. 14, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/documents/ksm-
indictment.pdf (charging the defendant with conspiracy to commit terrorism, 
conspiracy to commit violent acts and destroy aircraft, conspiracy to commit aircraft 
piracy, murder, and the destruction of the Twin Towers).  The indictment of Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed was eventually dismissed pursuant to a nolle prosequi order, after 
Congress deprived the Justice Department of funding for a civilian prosecution of 
Mohammed and the other September 11 defendants.  See Robert Chesney, AG Holder’s 
Statement on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators, and Link to the SDNY Indictment and 
Nolle Prosequi Filing, LAWFARE (Apr. 4, 2011, 2:28 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
ag-holders-statement-prosecution-911-conspirators-and-link-sdny-indictment-and-
nolle-prosequi-filing (providing Attorney General Holder’s statement about the 
proceedings against the September, 11 conspirators). 
 13. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming 
the application of the death penalty for Timothy McVeigh, the man convicted of the 
1995 Oklahoma City bombing). 
 14. See Indictment at 1–2, United States v. Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp. 3d 57 (D. Mass. 
2016) (No. 13-cr-10200), 2013 WL 3215742, at *1–2 (charging Dzhokhar Tsarnaev with 
offenses related to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing). 
 15. See Sherod Thaxton, Disciplining Death:  Assessing and Ameliorating Arbitrariness 
in Capital Charging, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 141–42 (2017) (noting that abolitionists are 
unlikely to prevail “anytime soon given [the death penalty’s] continued popularity 
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someday it will.  For the foreseeable future, though, and short of judicial 
abolition by the Supreme Court—which is certainly possible, though 
unlikely for the moment16—both abolitionists and supporters should 
acknowledge that many American jurisdictions are likely to continue 
enforcing and employing a death penalty, even if capital prosecutions 
and executions become increasingly rare.  The key law and public policy 
challenge, then, is to determine how best to design and administer it, 
where it exists.17  Of course, this challenge extends with special force to 
supporters of the death penalty.  Designing and applying a modern, 
limited, but effective death penalty requires an appreciation of the 
historical shortcomings and critiques of capital punishment’s 
administration in America.18  There are realities, therefore, that both 
sides of the abolition debate must come to accept. 
Consequently, rather than treading again the well-worn ground of 
political, philosophical, religious, and economic arguments for and 
against capital punishment, and accepting the reality of capital 
punishment’s near-term continuation—as well as the need to ensure its 
harmony within a regime committed to rights, social justice, and 
equality—this Essay has a more modest focus.  It evaluates the 
underappreciated place of the federal death penalty in American law 
and politics and makes two modest observations about the roles of the 
political branches of government in the federal death penalty’s scope 
and enforcement.  It then combines those observations with two modest 
suggestions for both the President and the Congress regarding federal 
                                               
among legislatures and the general public”). 
 16. See infra Section I.B.  For an argument that the Supreme Court should be 
willing to act “against public opinion” on the death penalty and engage in judicial 
abolition, see Kevin M. Barry, The Law of Abolition, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 
533–34 (2017), which states that any justices appointed by President Trump are not 
likely to support judicial abolition of the death penalty. 
 17. See Thaxton, supra note 15, at 141–42 (advocating for a system that reduces 
constitutional errors to improve fairness in death penalty sentencing). 
 18. Those criticisms and critiques are too many to enumerate here.  But among 
the more powerful recent ones are BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE:  HOW 
KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (2017), which argues that 
the demise of the death penalty will allow society to “focus on remedying inept 
lawyering, overzealous prosecution, inadequate mental health treatment, race 
discrimination, wrongful convictions, and excessive punishments”; and CAROL S. 
STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH:  THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 2–5 (2016), which argues that the attempt by courts to reform death 
penalty practices by constitutional regulation has created a more confusing, 
unworkable framework for its application. 
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death penalty practice and reform. 
First, I observe that the federal death penalty represents a useful 
model for systemic enforcement and administration of capital 
punishment, and one that is likely to be preserved (even strengthened) 
in the Trump administration through a combination of prosecutorial 
policy and judicial selection.  I contend, however, that the very source of 
this preservation—President Trump—also threatens the federal death 
penalty’s legitimacy.  Second, I observe the flaw in the narrative that the 
death penalty is incompatible with a regime of racial and social justice.  
Rather, examining the federal death penalty and federal criminal law, I 
argue that a limited and effective death penalty can form an important 
part of a robust scheme of civil rights enforcement.  Finally, I suggest a 
few modest ways in which Congress can strengthen that connection. 
I. THE PRESIDENCY AND THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY IN THE  
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
Legitimacy is critical to a system of criminal justice generally.  But in 
a time when capital punishment is increasingly under fire, even from 
American conservatives,19 it is particularly important that capital 
                                               
 19. See, e.g., Why We’re Concerned, CONSERVATIVES CONCERNED ABOUT DEATH 
PENALTY, https://conservativesconcerned.org/why-were-concerned (last visited June 
1, 2018) (lamenting that, after decades of trying, there is likely no way to make the 
death penalty “fair, accurate, and effective”).  For some notable commentary on the 
“conservative case,” see Mary Kate Cary, The Conservative Case Against the Death Penalty, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 30, 2011, 3:28 PM), http://www.usnews.com/ 
opinion/articles/2011/03/30/the-conservative-case-against-the-death-penalty, which 
argues that “[p]ro-life means pro-life in all things, not just abortion”; S.E. Cupp, The 
Conservative Case Against the Death Penalty, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 6, 2014, 2:14 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/conservative-case-death-penalty-article-
1.1781639, which argues that everyone should question their beliefs about the death 
penalty, especially conservatives; Leon Neyfakh, The Conservative Case Against the Death 
Penalty, BOS. GLOBE (May 25, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/05/ 
24/the-conservative-case-against-death-penalty/6NsOMqKbpJeIVMlynelCIM/ 
story.html, which profiles the growing number of conservatives opposing the death 
penalty due to reasons such as their religious affiliation and general distrust of the 
government; and George F. Will, Opinion, Capital Punishment’s Slow Death, WASH. POST 
(May 20, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/capital-punishments-
slow-death/2015/05/20/f3c14d32-fe4f-11e4-8b6c-0dcce21e223d_story.html, which 
highlights that the conservative case against the death penalty is based on three main 
premises:  first, that the “power to inflict death” gives the government too much power, 
which is “discordant with conservatism”; second, that administering the death penalty 
is irreversible and cannot be corrected if new evidence comes to light; and third, that 
the death penalty’s ability to deter crime is ineffective because it is applied so 
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punishment be—and be perceived as—legitimate.  Consequently, 
those who wish to protect the death penalty in America must keep it 
respectable and responsible.  Public support will broadly wane if the 
public senses that capital punishment is illegitimate:  if it is applied 
foolishly, if it appears generally arbitrary or unfair, or if its financial 
cost is not exceeded by its capacity for doing justice.  Despite a 
prevailing narrative among abolitionists that capital punishment in 
America is hopelessly flawed and inconsistent with human dignity, 
there are reasons to think that the federal death penalty system offers 
at least some reason to remain confident that a narrowly-tailored, 
deliberate, and objective death penalty process can exist.  Although 
federal death row inmates account for a small percentage of total death 
row inmates across the country,20 the federal death penalty system has 
shown that it can be compatible with our humanity and moral agency. 
A. Federal Death Penalty Review and the Age of Trumpism 
Apart from the provisions of substantive federal criminal law that provide 
for imposition of the death penalty for certain serious offenses, the 
procedures for seeking and imposing the death penalty in federal court are 
governed by the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA)21 and by the lesser-
known—but critically important—internal policies at the Department of 
Justice that bind federal prosecutors and Department leadership.22 
                                               
sporadically. 
 20. See Federal Death Row Prisoners, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-row-prisoners (last updated July 25, 
2017) (illustrating how, as of July 2017, there are only sixty-one federal inmates 
currently sitting on death row). 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2012).  See generally Christopher Q. Cutler, Comment, Death 
Resurrected:  The Reimplementation of the Federal Death Penalty, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1189, 
1191 (2000) (discussing history of the federal death penalty and evaluating its 
expansion via the FDPA).  Enacted in 1994, the FDPA expanded the federal 
government’s ability to seek the death penalty.  See David J. Novak, Anatomy of a Federal 
Death Penalty Prosecution:  A Primer for Prosecutors, 50 S.C. L. REV. 645, 645 (1999).  It did 
so by allowing federal prosecutors to seek the death penalty for a wider number of 
crimes.  Id.  Moreover, it provided for a new system to review the death penalty.  See 
John P. Cunningham, Comment, Death in the Federal Courts:  Expectations and Realities of 
the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 939, 940–41 (1998) (describing 
how the FDPA expanded prosecution of death penalty cases by increasing the number 
of eligible crimes to sixty). 
 22. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-10.010 to -10.200 
(2016) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/usam.  For a 
thorough discussion of the protocol, see Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty:  History and 
2018] THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY 1619 
 
The FDPA, enacted in 1994, sets forth the relevant procedural 
framework for federal death penalty cases.  It includes eligibility 
factors, relevant lists of aggravators and mitigators, the standard for 
determining whether a death sentence can be imposed, and various 
other provisions that govern federal capital litigation.23  It does not, 
however, make judgments about when a death sentence should be 
sought against a federal defendant.  Those judgments rest entirely with 
the Department of Justice and, more precisely, the Attorney General. 
At the initial stages of pursuing a federal death penalty case, as set forth 
in the Department’s death penalty review protocol, the decision whether 
to ultimately seek the death penalty belongs solely to the Attorney 
General.24  But, that decision is informed by advice and recommendations 
from others within the Department, and from the United States 
Attorney’s Office (which could even have its own internal death penalty 
review procedures with respect to making its initial recommendations in 
the case) to the Capital Case Section, to the Attorney General’s Review 
Committee for Capital Cases, to the Office of the Deputy Attorney 
General and, finally, to the Office of the Attorney General.25 
Within this multi-layered review process, decision makers consider the 
nature of the crime, the strength of the evidence, aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, among other aspects of the case.26  The 
process does not consider the race or ethnicity of either the defendant 
or the victim,27 nor does it depend upon geography.28  It is popular today 
to claim that the death penalty generally has a geographic bias,29 but the 
                                               
Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 406–19 (1999). 
 23. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3593. 
 24. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 22, § 9-10.050 (“[T]he Attorney General 
will make the final decision whether to seek the death penalty.”). 
 25. Id. §§ 9-10.040, -10.050, -10.130. 
 26. Id. § 9-10.140.C–D (listing factors that should be considered when seeking the 
death penalty). 
 27. Id. § 9-10.140.A (“[B]ias for or against an individual based upon characteristics 
such as race or ethnic origin play no role in any recommendation or decision as to 
whether to seek the death penalty.”). 
 28. Id. § 9-10.140.B (describing the multi-tiered review process used to achieve 
more uniform results across districts).  For commentary that offers both praise and 
criticism for the protocol’s treatment of geographic uniformity, see Eileen M. Connor, 
The Undermining Influence of the Federal Death Penalty on Capital Policymaking and Criminal 
Justice Administration in the States, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 149, 157–60 (2010), 
which lauds the Department’s goal of geographic uniformity in bringing death penalty 
prosecutions, but points out how this is hindered by a lack of federal resources. 
 29. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–62 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
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federal death penalty has been applied with geographic diversity, 
including—somewhat controversially—in jurisdictions that do not have 
the death penalty as a matter of state law.30  Moreover, capital defendants 
                                               
(suggesting that geography affects who is sentenced to death based on the power of local 
prosecutors, the availability of resources for public defenders, the racial composition 
within a county, and the political pressures faced by judges seeking reelection); see also 
John D. Bessler, The Inequality of America’s Death Penalty:  A Crossroads for Capital Punishment 
at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 
487, 544–46 (2017) (describing how death penalty adjudications still suffer from 
geographic bias, particularly in the “states of the old Confederacy” like Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, 
which “account for the vast number of executions carried out since 1976”); Garrett et al., 
supra note 10, at 563–64; Evan J. Mandery, Gregg at 40, 46 SW. L. REV. 275, 286 (2017) 
(describing geographic disparities in administering death penalty). 
 30. See Libby Sander, Judge Imposes Death in Killing of North Dakota Student, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/09/us/09sentence.html 
(reporting that the death penalty was imposed on a sex offender convicted in federal 
court of abducting and murdering a college student despite the fact that North Dakota 
no longer has the death penalty).  At least one scholar has argued that this practice is 
unconstitutional pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.  See Michael J. Zydney 
Mannheimer, When the Federal Death Penalty Is “Cruel and Unusual,” 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 
819, 821 (2006) (arguing that the sentencing of five federal defendants in states that 
do not authorize the death penalty violates the Eight Amendment’s ban on “cruel and 
unusual punishments”); cf. Eric A. Tirschwell & Theodore Hertzberg, Politics and 
Prosecution:  A Historical Perspective on Shifting Federal Standards for Pursuing the Death 
Penalty in Non-Death Penalty States, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 57, 63–65 (2009) (discussing 
Department of Justice approaches to death penalty prosecutions under various 
Attorneys General).  For interesting research on how geography and race may affect 
federal capital sentencing decisions, see G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial 
Geography of the Federal Death Penalty, 85 WASH. L. REV. 425, 429–33 (2010), which argues 
that racial distortions in the application of the federal death penalty are caused by the 
use of jury pools drawn from federal districts instead of at the county level. 
 One concern is that death qualification of juries contributes to geographic 
biases in application of the death penalty.  Death-qualification of capital juries has its 
critics.  See, e.g., Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner:  Capital Juries’ Bias and the 
Benefits of True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 770–71 (2006) (arguing that “the practice 
of death-qualifying capital juries . . . [lays] a thumb on the prosecutor’s side of the 
scale”).  But death-qualification, which the Supreme Court has upheld against Sixth 
Amendment challenges, see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986), is based on 
the premise that a prospective juror who categorically refuses to impose the death 
penalty has a bias against the law, and is excusable on that basis.  The juror is, by 
definition, not impartial, as the Sixth Amendment contemplates jurors will be in federal 
criminal trials.  See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423–24 (1985) (holding that jurors 
who oppose the death penalty can be struck for impartiality because not doing so allows 
people onto a jury who will likely be biased against finding for a defendant).  Imagine, 
for example, that the government brings a drug trafficking prosecution in a jurisdiction 
in which a substantial majority of citizens oppose criminal drug laws.  Now imagine that 
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in the federal system are represented by learned counsel, who are 
experts in death penalty matters,31 and have the opportunity to present 
arguments through counsel to the Department’s leadership, making 
their case for why the Attorney General should not authorize the death 
penalty.32  The decision whether to seek the death penalty is therefore 
informed, deliberative, and thorough.  It is objective and apolitical.  It 
should inspire public confidence. 
Whether it will remain so during the current presidential 
administration is a separate matter.  The election of Donald Trump to 
the presidency could be significant for the American death penalty and, 
in particular, the federal death penalty.  Most immediately, it seems clear 
that the Trump Administration will seek to preserve, if not affirmatively 
strengthen, the federal government’s use of capital punishment.33  This 
has been, and likely will continue to be, reflected in his political 
appointments to leadership posts at the Justice Department, as well as 
appointments to the federal courts.34  But it remains to be seen whether 
the President—constantly embroiled in scandal and controversy, and 
with a penchant for speaking publicly in ways that have been critical of 
the Justice Department,35 and specifically of Attorney General Jeff 
                                               
a prospective juror says during voir dire that he opposes all criminal drug laws and would 
not vote to convict or impose any legally proscribed punishment upon any person who 
is prosecuted pursuant to those laws.  There seems to be little question that this 
prospective juror would be excusable for cause.  Should it matter that the prospective 
juror’s views are shared by fifty-one, sixty, seventy, or even eighty percent of the state’s 
citizens?  No.  A juror with a bias against the law should not become immune from for-
cause removal simply because his bias is shared by others, even a substantial number of 
others.  The same principle of demanding impartiality with respect to the law ought to 
apply to capital jury selection.  See McCree, 476 U.S. at 178. 
 31. See 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (2012) (providing that defendants charged with capital 
crimes shall have access to counsel “learned in the law applicable to capital cases”). 
 32. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 22, § 9-10.130 (describing the Capital 
Review Committee’s process for reviewing death penalty recommendations). 
 33. See Ian Eppler, The Federal Death Penalty Under Trump, TAKE CARE (Apr. 27, 
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-federal-death-penalty-under-trump 
(suggesting that President Trump could strengthen the federal government’s use of 
capital punishment by encouraging prosecutors to seek more death penalty 
prosecutions or by “carry[ing] out the executions of the [sixty-two] individuals 
currently on federal death row”). 
 34. See infra Section I.B. 
 35. On November 3, 2017, the President told a group of reporters, “a lot of people 
are disappointed in the Justice Department, including me.”  Avery Anapol, Trump:  
Many People Are Disappointed in the Justice Department, “Including Me,” HILL (Nov. 3, 2017, 
10:01 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/358600-trump-lots-of-
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Sessions36—will undermine the Justice Department’s efforts to keep the 
federal death penalty respectable and responsible. 
As a presidential candidate, and even before, Donald Trump made no 
secret of his affinity for the death penalty.  Where a President supports 
the death penalty generally, there is nothing inherently wrong with 
publicly expressing that support in appropriate circumstances.  But 
there is a difference between expressing support for the death penalty 
generally, on the one hand, and calling for it in specific cases, on the 
other hand.  Trump’s calls for its imposition often have been 
controversial, reckless, and at odds with applicable law. 
In May 1989, Trump gained notoriety by publicly supporting the 
death penalty in a full-page advertisement that ran in New York 
newspapers shortly after the notorious rape of a jogger in Central Park.37  
The advertisement did not specifically reference the group of teens aged 
fourteen to sixteen that eventually would become known as the Central 
Park Five, all of whom were convicted of the rape and later exonerated.38  
                                               
people-are-disappointed-in-justice-department-including. 
 36. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 25, 2017, 3:12 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/889790429398528000 (accusing 
Sessions of being “VERY weak” on Hillary Clinton’s potential criminal activity); Donald 
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 24, 2017, 5:49 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/889467610332528641 (referring to 
Sessions as “our beleaguered A.G.”); see also Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, 
Trump Humiliated Jeff Sessions After Mueller Appointment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/us/politics/jeff-sessions-trump.html 
(reporting that the President berated Sessions and “said he should resign” after 
Sessions recused himself from the investigation into the possible Russian interference 
with the 2016 U.S. presidential election). 
 37. See Matt Ford, Donald Trump’s Racially Charged Advocacy of the Death Penalty, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/ 
donald-trump-death-penalty/420069. 
 38. Id.  The ad read: 
Mayor [Ed] Koch has stated that hate and rancor should be removed from our 
hearts.  I do not think so.  I want to hate these muggers and murderers.  They 
should be forced to suffer and, when they kill, should be executed for their 
crimes.  They must serve as examples so that others will think long and hard 
before committing a crime or an act of violence.  Yes, Mayor Koch, I want to 
hate these murderers and I always will.  I am not looking to psychoanalyze 
them or understand them, I am looking to punish them.  If punishment is 
strong, the attacks on innocent people will stop.  I recently watched a newscast 
trying to explain “the anger in these young men.”  I no longer want to 
understand their anger.  I want them to understand our anger.  I want them 
to be afraid.  How can our great society tolerate the continued brutalization 
of its citizens by crazed misfits?  Criminals must be told that their CIVIL 
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In 2014, they received a $40 million settlement in their suit for wrongful 
prosecution against the City of New York.39  In light of their ages and the 
nature of the offense, none of the teens could have received the death 
penalty for the offense even if one of them had committed it.40 
During the 2016 campaign, Bowe Bergdahl, an Army Sergeant who 
was held captive by the Taliban and charged with desertion in 2015, 
became yet another example of Trump’s public support for the death 
penalty.41  After the charges against Bergdahl were announced, Trump 
tweeted that he should “face the death penalty for desertion.”42  During 
campaign rallies, Trump referred to Bergdahl as a “traitor” and 
explicitly stated that he “should have been executed.”43  Under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, desertion is punishable by death if it 
occurs “in time of war.”44  In 2017, however, when Bergdahl faced 
sentencing, he received a substantially reduced sentence, with legal 
experts suggesting that this was in part because of the prejudicial 
statements made by the new commander-in-chief.45 
Also while a candidate, the President explicitly discussed the death 
penalty at a campaign fundraiser in New Hampshire, where he 
                                               
LIBERTIES END WHEN AN ATTACK ON OUR SAFETY BEGINS. 
Id. 
 39. In response to the settlement award, Trump ridiculed the City’s decision to 
pay and stated that the exonerated men did “not exactly have the pasts of angels.”  Id. 
 40. See id. (pointing out that the Central Park Five were both too young to qualify 
for the death penalty and that, in 1977, the Supreme Court invalidated the death 
penalty for the rape of an adult woman). 
 41. See Richard A. Oppel Jr., Bowe Bergdahl Avoids Prison for Desertion; Trump Calls 
Sentence a “Disgrace,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/ 
03/us/bowe-bergdahl-sentence.html (describing how President Trump repeatedly 
denounced Sergeant Bergdahl during campaign speeches and called for him to 
receive the death penalty). 
 42. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 26, 2015, 4:45 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/581059354511671296. 
 43. See Meghan Keneally, Donald Trump Has Condemned Bowe Bergdahl and His 
Taliban Release from the Beginning, ABC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2017, 1:19 PM), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/donald-trump-condemned-bowe-bergdahl-taliban-
release-beginning/story?id=50509168 (highlighting Donald Trump’s displeasure 
about the retrieval of Sergeant Bergdahl from Afghanistan after he was captured by 
the Taliban and ultimately exchanged for five other prisoners). 
 44. See 10 U.S.C. § 885 (2012) (stating that “[a]ny person found guilty of desertion . . . 
shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other 
punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion . . . occurs at any other time, 
by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct” (emphasis added)). 
 45. See Oppel, supra note 41. 
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announced that one of his first executive orders would involve the death 
penalty for those who kill members of law enforcement.46  According to 
news reports, the President agreed to push the idea after meeting with 
members of the Association.47  But it was unclear exactly what this 
promise meant.48 
As President, Trump has not wavered in his support for capital 
punishment.49  Still, although he has not acted on the campaign promise 
regarding police officer killings, and although it is entirely possible that 
the Portsmouth statement was simply a political appeal to this unique 
audience with no intention of fulfilling the promise, it would be difficult 
to imagine such a promise coming to fruition.  Mandatory death penalties 
have been unconstitutional for over forty years.50  Moreover, although an 
executive order cannot alter state criminal law, if Trump simply meant 
that he would direct federal prosecutors to seek the death penalty in cases 
involving the killing of federal law enforcement officers, then this might 
come closer to an appropriate use of a presidential order.  But it would 
raise serious questions about the prosecutorial independence of the 
Justice Department and the power of the president to direct the charging 
                                               
 46. See Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump Wants the Death Penalty for Those Who Kill Police 
Officers, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2015/12/10/donald-trump-wants-the-death-penalty-for-those-who-kill-
police-officers.  On December 9, 2016, speaking to the New England Police Benevolent 
Association in Portsmouth, Trump stated, “One of the first things I’d do in terms of 
executive orders, if I win, will be to sign a strong, strong statement that will go out to 
the country, out to the world, that anybody killing a policeman, a policewoman, a 
police officer, anybody killing a police officer:  Death penalty is going to happen, 
okay?”  Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. (questioning how Donald Trump promised he would issue an executive 
order imposing the death penalty on those who kill law enforcement officials when he 
“provided no details of how such an executive order would work or its legality”). 
 49. See Mark Berman, Trump Remains a Staunch Supporter of the Death Penalty, but Many 
Americans Are Souring on It, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/post-nation/wp/2017/11/02/trump-remains-a-staunch-supporter-of-the-death-
penalty-but-many-americans-are-souring-on-it (describing how President Trump 
advocated that the suspected attacker behind the 2017 New York City terrorist attack, 
Sayfullo Saipov, should receive the death penalty). 
 50. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 67, 85 (1987) (invalidating a Nevada 
statute that imposed a mandatory death penalty sentence upon prisoners serving life 
sentences without parole who commit murder in prison); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 301, 303–05 (1976) (requiring individualized sentencing determinations 
under the Eighth Amendment). 
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decisions of federal prosecutors.51  And it would plainly infringe the death 
penalty protocol, the point of which is to make individualized judgments 
based on the facts and circumstances of each case—a process designed to 
function objectively and without political influence.52 
The President’s willingness to interfere with internal Justice 
Department deliberations in capital cases became even more 
pronounced and problematic in the fall of 2017.  On November 1, 
2017, the President issued a statement via his Twitter account calling 
multiple times for the death penalty for Sayfullo Saipov,53 who is 
accused of killing eight people in New York City when he drove a rental 
truck onto a crowded bike path.54  The Government alleges that 
Saipov’s act was inspired by the Islamic State.55  The initial criminal 
complaint cited a capital offense,56 and the Government subsequently 
obtained an indictment charging Saipov with multiple capital crimes, 
including committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering, and using 
a motor vehicle to cause death.57 
Shortly after the President issued his tweets, some commentary 
focused on the so-called Nixon/Manson principle, recalling a public 
statement by President Nixon that the notorious Charles Manson was 
                                               
 51. See Sally Q. Yates, Opinion, Protect the Justice Department from President Trump, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/opinion/sally-
yates-protect-the-justice-department-from-president-trump.html (describing how 
President Trump’s intrusion into Department affairs may irreversibly harm the agency 
and mar its perceived independence). 
 52. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 22, § 9-10.030 (“The overriding goal 
of the review process is to allow proper individualized consideration of the appropriate 
factors relevant to each case.”). 
 53. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 2, 2017, 1:54 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/926054936718307328 (“There is also 
something appropriate about keeping him in the home of the horrible crime he 
committed.  Should move fast.  DEATH PENALTY!”); Donald J. Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 1, 2017, 5:43 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
realDonaldTrump/status/925931294705545216 (“NYC terrorist was happy as he 
asked to hang ISIS flag in his hospital room.  He killed [eight] people, badly injured 
[twelve].  SHOULD GET DEATH PENALTY!”). 
 54. Indictment at 7–12, United States v. Saipov, No. 1:17-cr.-00722 (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 
Nov. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Saipov Indictment], https://www.courtlistener.com/ 
recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.484263/gov.uscourts.nysd.484263.8.0.pdf. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Complaint at 1–2, United States v. Saipov, No. 17 mag 8177 (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 
Nov. 1, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4165614/U-S-v-
Sayfullo-Saipov-Complaint.pdf. 
 57. See Saipov Indictment, supra note 54, at 7–12. 
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guilty after having been accused of involvement in multiple horrific 
murders in California.58  Manson’s lawyers moved for a mistrial, citing 
prejudice created by President Nixon’s statement.59  President Nixon 
subsequently withdrew the remark.60  But the real problem with the 
President’s tweets has nothing to do with the Nixon/Manson 
principle.  The real problem is that President Trump’s tweets—which 
are official public statements of the President61—could undermine 
perceptions about the objectivity of the internal review process at the 
Justice Department. 
If federal prosecutors, and the Attorney General in particular, sense 
that they must seek the death penalty whenever the President publicly 
calls for it, then the protocol review process effectively becomes a 
sham.  That sensibility could be especially strong in an Administration 
where public disagreement with the President is seen as problematic, 
and where both the Attorney General and the Justice Department 
generally have already been subjected to the President’s scorn.62  And 
                                               
 58. See Joan Biskupic, Did Donald Trump Subvert the Case Against New York City Terror 
Suspect?, CNN (Nov. 2, 2017, 4:33 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/02/ 
politics/trump-new-york-city-death-penalty/index.html (discussing the parallels 
between Trump’s tweets and President Nixon’s public comments that could have 
tainted the government’s case against Charles Manson); see also Allen Rostron, The Law 
and Order Theme in Political and Popular Culture, 37 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 323, 351 n.198 
(2012) (explaining that President Nixon, while talking to a reporter in 1970, referred 
to Manson as “a man who was guilty, directly or indirectly, of eight murders without 
reason,” a comment that Nixon’s press secretary quickly walked back). 
 59. See Robert B. Semple, Nixon Calls Manson Guilty, Later Withdraws Remark, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 4, 1970), http://www.nytimes.com/1970/08/04/archives/nixon-calls-
manson-guilty-later-withdraws-remark-refers-to-coast.html. 
 60. Id. (quoting President Nixon) (“To set the record straight, . . . I do not know 
and did not intend to speculate as to whether the Tate defendants are guilty, in fact, 
or not.  All of the facts in the case have not yet been presented.  The defendants should 
be presumed to be innocent at this stage of their trial.”). 
 61. See Andrew Blake, DOJ:  Trump’s Tweets Are “Official Statements of the President,” WASH. 
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/nov/ 14/doj-
donald-trump-tweets-are-official-statements-of (noting that in response to a request for 
clarification regarding the status of President Trump’s tweets from Judge Mehta of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, the Department of Justice declared that “the 
government is treating the President’s statements . . . —whether by tweet, speech[,] or 
interview—as official statements of the President of the United States”). 
 62. See Schmidt & Haberman, supra note 36 (reporting that after hearing that the 
FBI had appointed a special counsel to investigate Russian election interference and 
conspiracy, President Trump berated Attorney General Jeff Sessions, calling him an 
“idiot” and telling him he should resign). 
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while the death penalty protocol does not create enforceable rights,63 
and while the separation of powers would ordinarily protect the 
protocol review process from judicial inquiry,64 one can at least 
imagine a scenario in which defense lawyers for Saipov question in 
court the fairness and legitimacy of the decision-making process in 
light of the President’s tweets.  Even if Saipov were to lose on such a 
claim (as he should), it would be unfortunate if the President’s tweets 
led to such litigation and placed this unusual burden on federal 
prosecutors and courts.65 
B. Judicial Selection and the Preservation of Capital Punishment 
These stumbles aside, though, the Trump Administration will likely 
keep the federal death penalty robust.  One way of doing so, as 
previously discussed, will be to appoint high-level prosecutors who will 
be committed to enforcement of the federal death penalty.  Another 
                                               
 63. See United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 496 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the 
defendant had “no enforceable rights under the death penalty protocol and that any 
violation of it would not entitle him to a new penalty trial”). 
 64. See United States v. Slone, 969 F. Supp. 2d 830, 833–34 (E.D. Ky. 2013) 
(explaining that federal courts do not have the authority to instruct the Executive 
Branch in its exercise of prosecutorial discretion, including “the decision whether to 
seek the death penalty”); United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1483 (D. Colo. 
1996) (holding that the Department of Justice’s decision to file death penalty notices 
according to the death penalty protocol “is not judicially reviewable”); cf. United States 
v. Shakir, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (citing separation of powers 
in denying defense requests to order pre-authorization discovery and to prohibit death 
penalty authorization). 
 65. Most recently, President Trump has publicly advocated the death penalty in 
some drug trafficking cases.  See Tessa Berenson, President Trump Outlines Death Penalty 
for “Big Pushers” in Opioid Plan, Time (Mar. 19, 2018), http://time.com/5206107/ 
donald-trump-new-hampshire-opioids. For now, the White House’s position appears 
to be to encourage the use of death penalty for traffickers “where appropriate under 
current law,” rather than to create a new capital statute for death resulting from drug 
transactions.  See Fact Sheets:  President Donald J. Trump’s Initiative to Stop Opioid Abuse and 
Reduce Drug Supply and Demand, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-
initiative-stop-opioid-abuse-reduce-drug-supply-demand.  Attorney General Sessions 
has also directed federal prosecutors to consider the death penalty in appropriate 
drug-related cases.  See Guidance Regarding Use of Capital Punishment in Drug-
Related Prosecutions, Memorandum to U.S. Attorneys from the Attorney General 
(Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1045036/download.  This rhetoric has 
been somewhat less problematic than that in the Saipov case because the President 
appears to be advocating the death penalty generally, rather than in a specific case and 
without all available evidence. 
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will be through the appointment of judges who will not use 
constitutional adjudication to abolish capital punishment.  Perhaps 
most importantly, President Trump’s appointment of Neil Gorsuch to 
the Supreme Court—filling the Seat left vacant for nearly 300 days 
after Justice Antonin Scalia’s death—has significantly reduced the 
chances of judicial abolition of all death penalties by the Court on 
Eighth Amendment grounds.66 
Justice Scalia openly rejected categorical challenges to the death 
penalty’s constitutionality.67  And he was consistently critical of judicial 
abolitionism.68  The vacancy created by his February 2016 death 
created the possibility that President Obama, or the next President, 
could fill the seat with someone who would be more open to 
arguments against the death penalty’s constitutionality.  When it 
became clear that President Obama’s nomination of Judge Merrick 
Garland would not be considered by the Republican-controlled 
Senate,69 the focus then shifted to potential appointment in either a 
Trump- or Hillary Clinton-led administration.  Clinton had spoken 
publicly about her support for capital punishment (notably, for 
preserving the federal death penalty), but had also indicated her view 
that the Supreme Court should consider the continued vitality of state 
death penalty systems.70  Trump’s election, though, and his subsequent 
                                               
 66. See J. Richard Broughton, The Death Penalty and Justice Scalia’s Lines, 50 AKRON 
L. REV. 203, 220–21 (2016) (arguing that a potential liberal replacement for Justice 
Scalia could join Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor in abolishing the 
death penalty under Eighth Amendment grounds, but that outcome became far less 
likely after Donald Trump won the presidential election).  Justice Gorsuch’s decisions 
in the Tenth Circuit seem to indicate he would not favor abolition of the death penalty.  
See, e.g., Eizember v. Trammell, 803 F.3d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir. 2015) (explaining that 
federal courts owe a duty of “double deference” to a state trial court judge’s decision 
not to strike jurors in capital cases who may be biased in favor of the death penalty). 
 67. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS (May 2002) 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2002/05/gods-justice-and-ours (“[T]he 
constitutionality of the death penalty is not a difficult, soul-wrenching question.  It was 
clearly permitted when the Eighth Amendment was adopted . . . .  And so it is clearly 
permitted today.”); see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (rebutting constitutional concerns raised by Justice Breyer’s dissent). 
 68. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 199 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It 
is no proper part of the business of this Court, or of its Justices, to second-guess [the 
judgment of the people to have capital punishment].”). 
 69. See Ariane de Vogue, Remember Merrick Garland?  Supreme Court Nominee Waits 
(and Waits), CNN (Sept. 6, 2016, 7:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/06/ 
politics/merrick-garland-supreme-court-wait/index.html. 
 70. See Daniel Strauss, Clinton Lays Out Rationale for Death Penalty Support, POLITICO 
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appointment of Justice Gorsuch have created a greater likelihood that 
Scalia’s position will endure on the Court. 
Justice Gorsuch has not publicly indicated any support for 
arguments against the death penalty’s constitutionality generally.71  
And in his short time on the Court, he has voted to sustain death 
sentences against constitutional challenges, or otherwise deny 
certiorari in several capital cases brought by inmates, refusing to join 
calls for judicial reexamination of capital punishment more broadly.72 
Justice Gorsuch voted on the merits to uphold the death sentences 
in Davila v. Davis73 and McWilliams v. Dunn.74  He did not join the 
dissent from the denial of certiorari by Justice Breyer in McGehee v. 
Hutchinson,75 in which Justice Breyer desired review of an issue that 
raised questions about the constitutionality of the death penalty.76  He 
did not join the statement of Justices Breyer and Sotomayor respecting 
denial of certiorari in Floyd v. Alabama,77 arguing for review of a Batson 
v. Kentucky78 claim arising from capital jury selection.79  Nor did he join 
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor in dissenting from denial of 
                                               
(Feb. 4, 2016, 10:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/new-hampshire-primary-
2016-live-updates/2016/02/2016-democratic-debate-hillary-clinton-death-penalty-
218798 (quoting Clinton’s statements at the Democratic primary debate:  “I have much 
more confidence in the federal system[,] and I do reserve it for really heinous crimes 
in the federal system, like terrorism.”). 
 71. See Mark Joseph Stern, Neil Gorsuch Is Not a Villain, SLATE (Jan. 31, 2017, 10:14 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/01/ 
neil_gorsuch_is_not_a_villain.html (“[Gorsuch] has issued few death penalty 
decisions but divulged no qualms about its constitutionality and will probably resist 
efforts to limit its application.”). 
 72. See, e.g., McGehee v. Hutchinson, 137 S. Ct. 1275, 1276 (2017) (voting with the 
majority to deny a stay of execution and deny a writ of certiorari for an inmate alleging 
that “Arkansas’[s] current lethal-injection protocol posed a substantial risk of severe 
pain” in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
 73. 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017). 
 74. 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017); see Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2062 (joining the opinion of 
Justice Thomas that held that federal courts hearing federal habeas challenges cannot 
hear a defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, where the claim 
was not raised by state post-conviction counsel); McWilliams, 137 S. Ct. at 1801–02 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the State had not deprived capital defendant of 
rights to access mental health experts to assist with evaluation, preparation, and 
presentation of his defense under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)). 
 75. 137 S. Ct. 1275 (2017) (mem.). 
 76. Id. at 1276 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay of execution). 
 77. 138 S. Ct. 311 (2017) (mem.). 
 78. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 79. Floyd, 138 S. Ct. at 311 (Sotomayor, J., respecting denial of certiorari). 
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certiorari and stay in Otte v. Morgan,80 concerning denial of a trial on 
the validity of Ohio’s execution protocol.81  On this record, then, there 
is every reason to believe that Justice Gorsuch’s position will be 
consistent with that of Justice Scalia on the larger questions about the 
death penalty’s constitutionality and the role of the Court. 
This does not mean that the move for judicial abolition will quietly 
fade away.  Rather, the focus now will likely be on Justice Kennedy, and 
whether he will join the forces against the death penalty before he 
leaves the Court.  There is some support for this theory, but as I have 
explained elsewhere, one should not overstate the case.82  Justice 
Kennedy has not demonstrated the kind of hostility toward the death 
penalty that others like Justice Breyer have shown.83  And even though 
he has voted to invalidate death penalty practices on categorical 
grounds,84 he has never expressed a view that the death penalty per se 
violates the Constitution, nor joined Justice Breyer’s calls for granting 
review on the question.85 
It is therefore likely that the Trump Administration will be 
committed to a robust federal death penalty, and that President 
Trump’s appointees to the Court will protect the death penalty against 
per se constitutional challenges.  Moreover, unless Justice Kennedy is 
persuaded to join the chorus advocating judicial abolition, it is also 
likely that efforts to judicially kill capital punishment will flounder on 
the current Supreme Court.  But merely keeping capital punishment 
barely breathing is not good enough. 
                                               
 80. 137 S. Ct. 2238 (2017). 
 81. Id. at 2238 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay and 
denial of certiorari). 
 82. See Broughton, supra note 9, at 221–26; see also Barry, supra note 16, at 533 
(expressing skepticism that Justice Kennedy would join four other justices for abolition). 
 83. See, e.g., McGehee v. Hutchinson, 137 S. Ct. 1275, 1276 (2017) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting from denial of application for stay of execution); Tucker v. Louisiana, 136 
S. Ct. 1801, 1801 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Glossip v. 
Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 84. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446–47 (2008) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids the death penalty for aggravated rape of a child); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids the 
death penalty for those whose crime is committed before age eighteen); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids the 
death penalty for mentally disabled persons). 
 85. See, e.g., McGehee, 137 S. Ct. at 1277 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
application for stay of execution) (arguing that the Court should address the question 
of “whether the death penalty is consistent with the Constitution”). 
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Its protectors must keep it legitimate and strive to maintain public 
confidence in it.  One way to do that is to ensure a thorough, deliberate, 
objective, and apolitical system of deciding who should be subject to, 
and administering, the death penalty—a point that President Trump 
would do well to observe.  No matter how satisfying to his admirers and 
political base, thoughtless and indiscriminate calls for the death penalty 
in ongoing cases are neither necessary nor useful.86  The judgment of 
professional prosecutors at the Justice Department will be far more 
valuable to the federal system of capital punishment, and far more 
confidence-inspiring, given what we know about the President’s history 
of public remarks on death penalty matters.  Demagoguery will do 
nothing to help the modern death penalty. 
Another way of enhancing legitimacy is to demonstrate that a system 
of capital punishment can be consistent with a regime of civil and 
constitutional rights.  The next Part explores this connection in federal 
criminal law. 
II. CONGRESS, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY, AND  
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 
In the minds of many critics, capital punishment enjoys an uneasy—
if not hostile—connection to civil rights and civil liberties.87  One could 
hardly imagine, based on the sentiment of abolitionists and other 
critics, that the death penalty could ever serve the interests of a nation 
committed to civil and constitutional rights.  Nevertheless, despite the 
narrative that holds that the death penalty is incompatible with a 
regime of racial and social justice, this narrative is flawed.  The 
relationship of capital punishment to civil rights is not only possible but 
fully in force today through the federal criminal law of civil rights 
enforcement.  Moreover, there are compelling reasons for maintaining, 
or even strengthening, those connections.  First, deprivations of 
constitutional and civil rights undermine the political community’s 
                                               
 86. See supra note 53 (citing President Trump’s tweets demanding the death 
penalty for Sayfullo Saipov). 
 87. See infra note 114 (describing then-Senator Jeff Session’s proposed 
amendment to a federal hate crime bill mandating the death penalty for certain hate 
crime offenses); see also Mark J. MacDougall & Karen D. Williams, The Federal Death 
Penalty Scheme Is Not a Model for State Reform of Capital Punishment Laws, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 
1647, 1670–71 (2018).  Often, the death penalty is also alleged to be inconsistent with 
human rights.  See Barry, supra note 16, at 526–27 (surveying the opinions of judges 
who have advocated for the abolition of the death penalty in the United States). 
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security in ways similar to crimes against the person, with which capital 
punishment is ordinarily associated.  Second, where the crimes are 
motivated by animus based on personal or religious identity, there are 
sound reasons for treating such motives as especially aggravating.  And 
finally, civil rights offenses may involve serious abuses of government 
power, which create special dangers to the personal and political 
security of the community by threatening the rule of law.  By ensuring 
a robust connection between serious punishments, including capital 
punishment, and the enforcement of civil rights, the Government can 
mitigate some of the concerns about whether the death penalty is 
applied evenhandedly.  It can also inspire greater confidence that the 
death penalty can be consistent with the interests of groups that have 
historically been subjected to both and state and private violence and 
that have not historically enjoyed political power. 
A. Existing Criminal Statutes 
Federal criminal law already provides for the possibility of a death 
sentence in cases involving violations of civil rights.88  This is perhaps the 
most glaring difficulty with the contention that civil rights and an 
effective death penalty are incompatible.  Not only is the death penalty 
possible in such cases, it has actually been employed.89  Chapter 13 of 
Title 18, United States Code, supplies the relevant statutory framework.90  
In particular, four statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 241, 245, and 247, 
criminalize acts of interference with a person’s constitutional rights or 
other designated activities and prohibits depriving constitutional rights 
on the basis of race.  All four statutes provide for the death penalty. 
Section 241 makes it a crime to engage in a conspiracy to “injure, 
oppress, threaten, or intimidate” a person in any American jurisdiction 
“in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to 
him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his 
                                               
 88. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, 247 (2012). 
 89. See Khushbu Shah et al., Dylann Roof Jury:  Death Penalty for Charleston Church 
Shooter, CNN (Jan. 10, 2017, 7:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/10/us/ 
dylann-roof-trial/index.html (reporting that Dylann Roof, who killed nine people in 
a 2015 massacre at a historically black church in Charleston, South Carolina will 
“become the first federal hate crime defendant to be sentenced to death”). 
 90. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, 247.  The only civil rights statutes in Chapter 13 
that proscribe violent conduct and that do not contain a death penalty are the freedom 
of access to clinic entrances statute (§ 248), and the hate crimes enforcement statute 
(§ 249).  Id. §§ 248–249. 
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having so exercised the same.”91  It further forbids going “in disguise on 
the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or 
hinder [a person’s] free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege 
so secured.”92  If death results from the underlying offense, or if the 
perpetrators attempt to kill, the offense may be punished by death.93  
The statute does not require state action or action under color of law.94 
Section 242 makes it a crime for anyone, “under color of any law,” to 
willfully deprive a person of constitutional or legal rights or to subject 
someone to different punishments on account of race or alienage.95  
This is the statute that federal prosecutors typically use to punish law 
enforcement officers who use excessive force against suspects or 
detainees.96  Prosecutions pursuant to this statute are often complicated 
by the high bar that the statute sets for proof of the willfulness mens rea, 
a subject with which the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
repeatedly grappled.97  Assuming that its elements are satisfied, though, 
it provides for the death penalty if death results from the commission of 
the offense or where there is an attempt to kill.98 
                                               
 91. § 241. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (stating that the offense may be punished by death if death results from any 
acts enumerated in “violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an 
attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, . . . or an attempt to kill”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. § 242 (“Whoever, under color of any law . . . willfully subjects any person in any 
State . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, 
pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, 
or race [shall be subject to criminal punishment].”). 
 96. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 88 (1996) (noting that the four Los 
Angeles police officers involved in the beating of Rodney King in 1991 were indicted 
under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for “violating King’s constitutional rights under color of law”). 
 97. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945) (holding that “willfully” in 
§ 242’s predecessor statute should be construed to mean “connoting a purpose to 
deprive a person of a specific constitutional right”); United States v. Bradley, 196 F.3d 
762, 769 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A defendant need not ‘have been thinking in constitutional 
terms’ to willfully violate a constitutional right.” (quoting Screws, 325 U.S. at 106)); 
United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 208–09 (3d Cir. 1997) (recognizing that 
“Screws is not a model of clarity” and holding that § 242 liability is triggered “if it can 
be proved—by circumstantial evidence or otherwise—that a defendant exhibited 
reckless disregard for a constitutional or federal right”); see also Frederick M. 
Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs:  The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 
67 TUL. L. REV. 2213, 2179–93 (1993) (discussing Screws and the problems created by 
the statutory language of § 242). 
 98. § 242. 
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Another death penalty provision exists in the federally protected 
activities statute, § 245.99  This statute criminalizes, whether under color 
of law or not, willful injury, intimidation, or interference with the exercise 
of certain designated activities (such as voting, participation in or 
enjoyment of an activity administered by a federal agency, jury service), or 
on account of race, color, religion, or national origin where the victim is 
engaged in federally protected designated activities.100  As in previous 
statutes, the death penalty provision becomes available where death 
results from the underlying offense or where there is an attempt to kill.101 
Finally, the death penalty applies for violations of the religious 
obstruction statute, § 247, that result in death, or where there is an 
attempt to kill.102  This law makes it a crime to intentionally “deface[], 
damage[], or destroy[] any religious real property” on account of its 
religious character, or to use force or the threat of force to obstruct 
any person’s free exercise of religious beliefs.103  It is also an offense to 
deface, damage, or destroy any religious real property “because of the 
race, color, or ethnic characteristics of any individual associated with 
that religious property.”104 
Congress has taken an active role in the judicial determination of 
whether to seek capital punishment.  Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3592 
provides a non-exclusive list of mitigating factors that must be 
considered when the finder of fact is determining whether to seek 
capital punishment.105  While no one mitigating factor is dispositive, 
and the list is not exhaustive, § 3592 requires that factors such as the 
defendant’s impaired capacity, possibility of duress, and lack of prior 
criminal record be considered.106 
As I have explained elsewhere, there is some history behind the 
choice to forego a death penalty provision in the hate crimes law.107  It 
                                               
 99. § 245. 
 100. Id. (“Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of 
force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate 
or interfere with . . . any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate 
such person or any other person or any class of persons from [engaging in various 
public activities is guilty of a crime].”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. § 247. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. § 3592. 
 106. § 3592(a)(1)–(8). 
 107. See Broughton, supra note 9, at 192–96. 
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is useful here to summarize again that history.  The law makes it a 
federal crime to willfully cause, or attempt to cause, bodily injury 
through the use of fire, firearm, dangerous weapon, or explosive or 
incendiary device “because of the actual or perceived race, color, 
religion, or national origin of any person.”108  The same conduct is 
unlawful where it is done “because of the actual or perceived religion, 
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or 
disability of any person,”109 where the conduct bears a statutorily 
defined connection to interstate commerce.110  The maximum 
punishment is ten years in prison,111 though if death results or the 
offense includes kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt 
to kill, the maximum punishment is life in prison.112  Although the 
original House version of the bill did not contain a death penalty 
provision,113 then-Senator Jeff Sessions offered one as an amendment 
during Senate consideration.114  Senator Ted Kennedy of 
Massachusetts, though he opposed a final bill with a death penalty 
provision, nonetheless offered an amendment that would have 
established specific standards for seeking the death penalty in a hate 
crimes case, should the Sessions Amendment remain intact.115  Some 
supporters of the hate crime legislation viewed the Sessions 
                                               
 108. § 249(a)(1). 
 109. § 249(a)(2)(A). 
 110. § 249(a)(2)(B). 
 111. § 249(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A)(i). 
 112. § 249(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 113. See H.R. 1913, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 114. See 155 CONG. REC. S7683 (2009) (considering Amendment No. 1615 as 
modified); see also S. Amend. 1615 to S.1390, 111th Cong. (2009).  The Amendment 
provided that the defendant “shall be subject to the penalty of death in accordance 
with chapter 228 (if death results from the offense), if—(i) death results from the 
offense; or (ii) the offense includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated 
sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill.”  
155 CONG. REC. S7683. 
 115. See id.  The Kennedy Amendment (Amendment No. 1614) would have 
required the Attorney General to certify that the defendant was among the “worst of 
the worst,” as Senator Kennedy described it, and would have required federal courts 
to conduct proportionality review to make sure that the case was like other cases where 
the federal government had sought and received the death penalty more than half of 
the time.  Id. at S7683–84 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that “this amendment 
adds appropriate safeguards in cases where the federal government seeks the 
ultimate—and irreversible—penalty of death,” and that the amendment’s 
“requirements are a significant improvement over existing [f]ederal practice in death 
penalty cases”); see S. Amend. 1614 to S.1390, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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Amendment as an effort to kill the legislation, knowing that those in 
Congress who favored it would not do so if it imposed a death 
penalty.116  Of course, the final version of the bill provided that life in 
prison would be the most severe punishment available.117 
This history of the hate crimes law is also instructive because 
opponents of the Sessions Amendment further argued that it 
expanded the federal death penalty and was inconsistent with a 
commitment to civil rights.118  As demonstrated above, the force of that 
argument is diminished once one realizes that the federal death 
penalty already extends to cases involving violations of civil rights.  Put 
another way, the federal death penalty can be, and has been, used to 
vindicate—rather than oppress—civil and constitutional rights. 
Consider, for example, the recent case of Dylann Roof, who was 
convicted of civil rights and gun crimes after he shot and killed nine 
African Americans during Bible study in a historic African-American 
church in Charleston, South Carolina.119  There was no question that 
                                               
 116. See Advocacy Letter from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights et al., to 
the U.S. Senate, Oppose the Sessions Amendments to the Matthew Shepard Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act, (July 20, 2009), https://civilrights.org/oppose-the-sessions-
amendments-to-the-matthew-shepard-hate-crimes-prevention-act (criticizing Senator 
Sessions’s proposed amendments as they could lead to politically motivated and 
unconstitutional applications of the new hate crime law); Letter from Am. Civil 
Liberties Union to the U.S. Senate, ACLU Urges NO Vote on SA 1615—Sessions Death 
Penalty Amendment to Hate Crimes Amendment in Defense Authorization Bill (S. 
1390); Sessions Amendment is Unconstitutional, (July 20, 2009) [hereinafter ACLU 
Letter], https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/asset_upload_file
483_40374.pdf (expressing concerns that the Sessions Amendment would expand the 
death penalty to include non-homicide offenses); Editorial, A Deadly Amendment to the 
Hate-Crimes Bill, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/ 
aug/07/opinion/ed-hate7 (“Republican strategists apparently see [the Sessions 
Amendment] as a kind of poison pill—they’re hoping that when a conference 
committee meets to reconcile the House and Senate defense bills, it will discard the 
Shepard Act rather than be sidetracked by a debate over capital punishment . . . .”). 
 117. See H.R. REP NO. 111-288, at 661–62 (2009) (Conf. Rep.). 
 118. See 155 CONG. REC. S7695 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (asserting that it 
would be unconstitutional to expand the federal death penalty to apply to certain hate 
crimes, such as kidnapping, where the victim’s life was not taken); ACLU Letter, supra 
note 116 (arguing that it would be a violation of civil rights to expand the federal death 
penalty, since it is disproportionately imposed on black defendants); Press Release, 
Am. Civil Liberties Union, Senate Adopts Death Penalty Amendment to Hate Crimes 
Provision (July 21, 2009), https://www.aclu.org/news/senate-adopts-death-penalty-
amendment-hate-crimes-provision. 
 119. See Maya Rhodan, Dylann Roof Found Guilty of All Charges in Charleston Church 
Shooting, TIME (Dec. 15, 2016, 4:37 PM), http://time.com/4603863/dylann-roof-
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Roof perpetrated the crime (and thus no reasonable possibility of an 
actual innocence claim), nor was there any question that the crime was 
a capital one.120  Although Roof was also charged in federal court with 
violating the hate crimes statute, his death-eligibility was based on his 
use of a firearm during a crime of violence, as well as the religious 
obstruction statute.121  Notably, Roof’s capital trial was authorized by 
Attorney General Loretta Lynch.122  Using its Petite Policy, the Justice 
Department could have deferred all prosecution to South Carolina.123  
But it did not, because the Department had a substantial federal 
interest in civil rights enforcement that would not have been uniquely 
vindicated by the state prosecution.124  Of course, the mere fact that 
the Department used the case to vindicate its interest in civil rights 
enforcement did not require that it seek the death penalty.  But that 
decision is significant because it demonstrates how the federal death 
penalty can be used in a case that also vindicates the protection of civil 
rights—where there was no serious question of guilt, where the 
aggravation evidence was overwhelming and the mitigation weak, and 
where the victims were targeted based on their race. 
                                               
verdict-guilty (reporting that a jury took less than two hours to find Roof guilty of all 
thirty-three charges of murder, attempted murder, and federal hate crimes). 
 120. See id. (explaining that, because Roof had confessed to the crime and two of the 
adult survivors of the incident testified, the only remaining questions were whether Roof’s 
act was a hate crime and whether it impeded on the church members’ religious freedom). 
 121. Id.; see Indictment at 15, United States v. Roof, 252 F. Supp. 3d 469 (D.S.C. 
2017) (No. 2:15-cr-472-RMG), 2015 WL 4461565, at *15 [hereinafter Indictment of 
Dylann Roof] (charging Dylann Roof under 18 U.S.C. § 247(a)(2)). 
 122. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch 
Statement on the Case of Dylann Roof (May 24, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-statement-case-dylann-roof (authorizing the 
Government to seek the death penalty). 
 123. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 22, §§ 9-2.031, -10.110 (referencing 
Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), as the common-law source of dual and 
successive prosecution policy). 
 124. See id. § 9-27.230 (instructing attorneys for the government to use a balancing 
test to determine whether a substantial federal interest exists, which considers “[(1)] 
Federal law enforcement priorities, including any federal law enforcement initiatives 
or operations aimed at accomplishing those priorities; [(2)] The nature and 
seriousness of the offense; [(3)] The deterrent effect of prosecution; [(4)] The 
person’s culpability in connection with the offense; [(5)] The person’s history with 
respect to criminal activity; [(6)] The person’s willingness to cooperate in the 
investigation or prosecution of others; [(7)] The interests of any victims; and [(8)] 
The probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted”); see also 
Broughton, supra note 9, at 199–200 (discussing application of the Petite Policy in the 
Roof case). 
1638 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1611 
 
Consider also the case of Len Davis, an officer in the New Orleans 
Police Department who, with the help of two other men, planned and 
executed the murder of Kim Groves.125  Groves alleged that she saw 
Davis’s police partner, Sammie Williams, pistol-whip her nephew and 
filed a police brutality complaint against Davis.126  Davis then conspired 
with two other men—Paul Hardy, a New Orleans drug dealer, and 
Damon Causey—to kill Groves.127  Davis and Williams drove to Groves’s 
neighborhood, searched for her, and when they found her, contacted 
the triggerman.128  Later that night, the triggerman shot and killed 
Groves.129  At the time, Davis was also the subject of an ongoing Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation into police corruption in 
New Orleans.130  The FBI conducted surveillance and captured phone 
conversations involving the plot to kill Groves.131  Davis was convicted 
of multiple civil rights offenses and, on both his original sentencing 
and on resentencing, was sentenced to death.132  The Fifth Circuit 
eventually affirmed his convictions and death sentence.133 
Roof and Davis are significant not simply because they were high-
profile cases in which the Government sought the death penalty.134  
Rather, the Government’s decision to seek the death penalty also 
demonstrated that the most serious punishment would remain 
available to vindicate civil and constitutional rights. 
That decision has important normative value.  Federal criminal law 
                                               
 125. See United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 670–71 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding an 
aggravating factor of “future dangerousness” sufficient to trigger the federal death penalty). 
 126. Id. at 670. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 670–71. 
 129. Id. at 671. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 671–73.  Davis was originally charged with conspiracy in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 241 (2012), deprivation of rights under color of law in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 242, as well as with 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), making it a crime to kill 
another person in an attempt to prevent that person from communicating with law 
enforcement.  Id. at 671.  The Fifth Circuit had earlier held that the evidence was 
legally insufficient on the latter charge and ordered resentencing based on a defect in 
the jury’s original penalty recommendations.  See United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407, 
421–23 (5th Cir. 1999).  Davis was therefore resentenced to death on the civil rights 
convictions.  Davis, 609 F.3d at 672–73. 
 133. Id. at 670. 
 134. See id.; Indictment of Dylann Roof, supra note 121, at 1. 
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distinguishes crimes against the person (e.g., murder135 or 
kidnapping136) and crimes against the state (e.g., espionage137 and 
bribery138).  Sometimes, those distinct forms of criminality intersect—
for example, killing a Member of Congress139 or assassinating the 
President.140  The civil rights crimes that implicate the federal death 
penalty also fall at a critical intersection of distinct kinds of crimes.  
They are violent crimes against the person, but they are also political 
crimes, in the sense that they undermine the legal protections of the 
citizenry and the institutional interests of the Government in 
safeguarding rights, which simultaneously helps both to limit 
Government power and better allow the Government to maintain 
tolerable order and legal equality.  Indeed, the federal Government 
has a unique role in protecting rights and that role has been a defining 
feature of our constitutional system since the post-Civil War period.141  
These civil rights crimes are therefore worthy of serious punishment 
not simply because they result in death, but because they undermine 
both the personal and political security of the citizenry. 
In conducting protocol review, the Justice Department should give 
substantial weight to any underlying facts that show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the offense deprived, or endeavored to deprive, 
any person of civil or constitutional rights.  Although the FDPA already 
helps to facilitate review of a defendant’s culpability, Congress could 
also help to facilitate a civil-rights-specific review and better allow juries 
to weigh a capital defendant’s culpability for civil rights offenses that 
result in death. 
B. Amending the FDPA 
Congress can further facilitate a review of a capital defendant’s 
culpability by amending the FDPA to include a greater emphasis on 
civil rights-based offenses.  Although the existing list of aggravators 
supplies a basis for possibly seeking the death penalty in some cases 
involving civil rights-based offenses, none of them are directed 
specifically at civil rights violations or bias-motivated conduct. 
                                               
 135. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111. 
 136. See id. § 1201. 
 137. See id. § 794. 
 138. See id. § 201. 
 139. See id. § 351(a). 
 140. See id. § 1751(a). 
 141. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. Amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2. 
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Aggravating factors, one of which must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt to render the defendant eligible for the death 
penalty,142 must narrow the class of death-eligible defendants.143  It is 
in this way that aggravators help to channel juror discretion.144  
Aggravators may not be vague,145 and the jury cannot be allowed to 
weigh invalid factors.146  But aggravators are also tools for 
demonstrating the nature of the crime, which can be a critical factor 
in the jury’s selection decision as to punishment.  That is, they help the 
jury to frame the selection decision not simply in terms of whether the 
elements of the crime were satisfied, but in a normative way that aids 
the jury in reaching a reasoned moral judgment about the appropriate 
penalty.147  They help the jury to distinguish those who deserve to die 
for the crime, and those who do not.148  Aggravators thus play a critical 
role in both the eligibility and selection decisions in capital sentencing. 
First, as I have suggested previously, Congress could amend 
18 U.S.C. § 3592(b)’s list of statutory aggravating factors to include 
killings based on the types of animus described in the hate crimes 
statute.149  Other jurisdictions enforce similar aggravators.150  By 
adopting such a provision and making the FDPA consistent with the 
practices of these other jurisdictions, the Government could amplify 
the interests that motivated the creation of the substantive offense 
statute initially.  It would also add to the FDPA’s scheme of statutory 
                                               
 142. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d). 
 143. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (stating that capital 
sentencing schemes may only apply to a narrow class of persons in order to pass 
constitutional muster). 
 144. See id. 
 145. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993) (cautioning that if aggravators 
are too vague, they cannot properly inform the sentencing authority). 
 146. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 398 (1999) (explaining that factors that 
would impermissibly skew the perception of the sentencing jury are invalid factors). 
 147. See United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1488 (D. Colo. 1996) 
(discussing the role of aggravators in selecting punishment). 
 148. See Creech, 507 U.S. at 474 (explaining that a list of aggravating factors helps 
juries be principled in their calculations, rather than simply characterizing every 
murder as “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible[,] and inhuman”). 
 149. See Broughton, supra note 9, at 198–99.  For additional commentary on FDPA 
aggravator reform, see Robert Steinbuch, Reforming Federal Death Penalty Procedures:  
Four Modest Proposals to Improve the Administration of the Ultimate Penalty, 40 IND. L. REV. 
97, 108–15 (2007). 
 150. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(16) (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 18-1.3-1201(5)(n) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(11) (2017). 
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aggravators that specifically relate to the motives of the defendant.151 
Second, Congress could add aggravating factors that either 
enumerate a violation of § 242 or that specifically state that the death 
resulted from the willful deprivation of rights under color of law.  In 
addition to aggravators that focus on the motivations of the defendants, 
the FDPA recognizes statutory aggravators that relate to the particular 
offense committed or to previous convictions for other serious 
offenses.152  If death results from the commission or attempted 
commission of a specific offense, the FDPDA permits the fact that death 
occurred to be considered as an aggravating factor to determine 
whether a “sentence of death is justified.”153  The specific offenses 
include destruction of an aircraft or motor vehicle; violence against a 
Member of Congress or Supreme Court Justice; espionage; certain uses 
of explosives; killings by prisoners serving life sentences; hostage-taking; 
treason; and aircraft piracy.154  In total, this aggravator lists twenty-one 
federal crimes that could serve as predicates for death-eligibility if death 
results from the commission or attempted commission of the offense.155  
Yet in neither § 3592(c)(1) nor in any of the prior conviction 
aggravators156 does the aggravator specifically relate to conduct under 
color of law or to bias-motivation.  As the Supreme Court held in 
Lowenfield v. Phelps,157 so long as the aggravator genuinely narrows the 
class of death-eligible defendants, it is constitutionally permissible for an 
aggravator to duplicate the elements of the underlying offense.158  In this 
instance, there is no question that these proposed aggravators would 
perform the constitutionally required narrowing function, as they would 
capture only a small category of murders and therefore apply only to a 
subclass of capital defendants.159 
Consider, for example, the case of Officer Michael Slager, a police 
officer in North Charleston, South Carolina.  Following a mistrial in state 
court, Slager pleaded guilty to federal civil rights charges after evidence 
showed Slager shooting unarmed motorist Walter Scott in the back five 
                                               
 151. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(7)–(8) (2012). 
 152. See § 3592(c)(1)–(4), (10), (12)–(13), (15). 
 153. § 3592(c). 
 154. See § 3592(c)(1). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See § 3592(c)(2)–(4), (10), (12)–(13), (15). 
 157. 484 U.S. 231 (1988). 
 158. Id. at 244. 
 159. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994) (requiring aggravating 
factors to apply in narrowly tailored situations, such as certain subsets of murder cases). 
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times, killing him.160  The shooting occurred after a traffic stop for a 
defective break light.161  In December 2017, Slager was sentenced to 
twenty years in prison, after a proceeding in which the federal district 
court determined that Slager’s conduct amounted to second-degree 
murder rather than manslaughter.162  Neither South Carolina nor the 
federal government sought the death penalty in the case. 
Although it is likely that a variety of factors influenced the Justice 
Department’s decision against the death penalty, it is worth noting that 
the Department may have believed that it could not make Slager 
eligible for the federal death penalty because none of the existing 
aggravators applied.163  Perhaps Slager’s case would not have ultimately 
merited capital punishment.  But Slager’s conviction and sentencing 
established that he did not act in self-defense, that he acted with 
malice, and that he willfully used excessive force against his victim, all 
based on the authority of his position as a police officer.164 
The Davis case discussed above is also useful here.165  The 
Government proved only a single statutory aggravator—that the crime 
involved substantial planning and premeditation.166  That was enough 
to obtain a death sentence, presumably because the jury gave that 
factor substantial weight in relation to the mitigating evidence that 
Davis proffered.167  But had the jury not assigned such weight to the 
single aggravator, Davis would have avoided a death sentence because 
                                               
 160. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former North Charleston, South 
Carolina, Police Officer Michael Slager Pleads Guilty to Federal Civil Rights Offense 
(May 2, 2017) [hereinafter Michael Slager Pleads Guilty], https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/former-north-charleston-south-carolina-police-officer-michael-slager-pleads-
guilty-federal.  The shooting was caught on mobile phone video.  See Matt Zapotosky 
& Wesley Lowery, Former S.C. Police Officer Pleads Guilty in Fatal Shooting Caught on Video, 
WASH. POST (May 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
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video/2017/05/02/9a235afe-2f35-11e7-9534-00e4656c22aa_story.html. 
 161. See Michael Slager Pleads Guilty, supra note 160. 
 162. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former North Charleston, South 
Carolina, Police Officer Michael Slager Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison for Federal 
Civil Rights Offense (Dec. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Michael Slager Sentenced to 20 Years 
in Prison], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-north-charleston-south-carolina-
police-officer-michael-slager-sentenced-20-years. 
 163. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (2012) (listing aggravating factors). 
 164. See Michael Slager Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison, supra note 162. 
 165. See supra notes 125–33 and accompanying text. 
 166. See United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 672 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 167. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (requiring jury to find that aggravating factors 
sufficiently outweighs mitigating factors). 
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no other statutory aggravators applied. 
In light of recent national debates about officer-involved shootings, 
particularly of unarmed citizens,168 and the related concern that those 
shootings may (in some cases) constitute excessive uses of force in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment,169 there are reasons for Congress 
to consider a capital sentencing scheme that allows capital juries to focus 
specifically on violence that is perpetrated by government actors who 
use their authority to kill without any legal justification.  To be sure, a 
violation of § 242 resulting in death, or the use of a firearm during the 
commission of a federal crime of violence (such as a hate crime or a 
willful deprivation of rights),170 is enough to implicate the federal death 
penalty protocol.  But the mere fact of committing a capital offense is 
not enough to render the defendant death-eligible in the federal system.  
The Government must also prove one of the mental state factors in the 
FDPA and at least one statutory aggravating factor, and these will be key 
considerations in the Justice Department’s review.171  Adding 
aggravators that specifically target abuses of governmental power that 
violate constitutional rights and result in death would ensure that capital 
punishment could at least remain available as a possibility for those who 
engage in the most oppressive of official acts, where they might 
otherwise escape the possibility of a capital trial pursuant to the existing 
scheme of statutory aggravators.  It is true that the Government could 
allege such conduct as a non-statutory aggravator without the need to 
amend the FDPA.172  But an amendment would have the virtue of 
                                               
 168. For a recent timeline of controversial police encounters, see Controversial Police 
Encounters Fast Facts, CNN (Dec. 8, 2017, 1:34 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/ 
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 170. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (j). 
 171. See id. §§ 3591(a)(2), 3593(c). 
 172. See id. § 3593(d) (requiring that a “finding with respect to any aggravating 
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allowing the factor to serve both eligibility and selection purposes.173 
Reforming the FDPA’s aggravation scheme in these ways therefore 
would not only be consistent with the constitutionally acceptable uses of 
aggravators, it would help to give jurors the opportunity to consider—and 
assign weight to—the fact that the defendant committed a serious abuse 
of governmental power or targeted the victim because of the defendant’s 
invidious bias or prejudice, either (or perhaps even both) of which 
resulted in the victim’s death.  Providing this information to the jury 
specifically in the form of an aggravating factors at the punishment phase 
would assist the jury in better understanding the nature of the crime and 
how the violations of civil and constitutional rights bear on the 
defendant’s culpability and death-worthiness.174  It is also consistent with 
a scheme of aggravators that targets conduct committed against the 
institutions and mechanisms of government.  Just as the existing list of 
aggravators includes a provision allowing jurors to give special weight to 
violence committed against high government officials,175 so, too, should 
aggravators reflect the harm done to the political community and to 
constitutional government by violence against rights.  In doing so, and by 
allowing the jury to weigh these factors, Congress can strengthen the 
relationship between imposition of the death penalty and vindication of 
civil and constitutional rights, beyond what is accomplished by the guilt 
phase in a civil rights prosecution. 
CONCLUSION 
No system of punishment is perfect or immune from serious 
criticism, and the federal death penalty is no exception to that truism.  
Despite apolitical enforcement, federal actors—from the President to 
federal prosecutors to the Congress—must remain aware of the 
political environment in which the federal death penalty exists.  Its 
critics, and its threats, come from left, right, and center.  Still, there is 
ample reason to view the federal death penalty charging process as fair, 
objective, deliberate, and informed.  And although the existing 
connection between the federal death penalty and civil rights 
                                               
factor must be unanimous”). 
 173. See id. 
 174. See United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1488 (D. Colo. 1996) (“The 
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enforcement is neither a necessary one, nor one that will persuade 
abolitionists or critics to support it, that connection is nevertheless 
worthy of being preserved and strengthened both by Justice 
Department review and congressional action.  Civil rights crimes, no 
less than national security crimes or traditional crimes against the 
person, reflect important national values that deserve vindication in 
the procedures that enable the most severe punishments.  These 
aspects of the federal death penalty, then, while only a small part of 
death penalty practice, at least offer reasons for public confidence. 
